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Chaum’s Voter-Verifiable election scheme introduces a new direction for elec-
tronic voting. The scheme eliminates the need to trust any machinery or authority,
and instead relies on mathematical proof to certify the trustworthiness of an elec-
tion. Audits at every stage of the election create transparency that should restore
voter confidence in the election process. We survey and categorize the field of elec-
tronic voting, and place Chaum’s scheme within this context. We then define a
framework of formal requirements of a voting system. We present Chaum’s scheme
itself, and give an analysis. Based on our technical analysis, we find the scheme to
be secure. However, after considering other implementation concerns, we recognize
various minor obstacles limiting its widespread adoption in today’s elections. De-
spite this, we believe that the substance of the scheme is promising and maybe an
improved, simpler variant might better suit future elections.
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Chapter 1
Introduction to Electronic Voting
1.1 Motivation
Free and fair governmental elections are of critical importance in a democracy.
Since they are very high-profile, elections have long been a target of fraud and cor-
ruption [55, 63]. And because the national constituency is so large, yet elections so
infrequent, there is a high likelihood of error. Therefore, it is crucial to have a trust-
worthy election scheme that delivers accurate results amidst errors and malicious
attacks.
Electronic voting with precinct-based electronic machines has been suggested
as an improvement over the way we currently conduct elections. Proponents ar-
gue that the major benefits include increased efficiency, convenience, and voter
anonymity, in conjunction with decreased long-term cost and labor [16, 45]. Plus,
an electronic user interface can alert the voter of and prevent under- or over-voting,
as well as facilitate voting for those with various disabilities.
Critics, however, suggest that there are problems inherent in the idea of using
electronic devices to aid in elections [41, 45]. The major complaint is that there is no
true way of controlling, tracking, or auditing the behavior of an electronic machine.
The machines act like black boxes. Voters currently have no way of ensuring that
their vote has been recorded correctly or counted, and the public has no way of
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verifying that the tally was computed correctly. Without having a way of verifying
an election’s validity, the results cannot be fully trusted. Tampering with either
the machine or the votes is not completely detectable. In addition, most electronic
voting machines today do not even have a mechanism that provides a meaningful
recount; this fact forces us to place trust in the machine itself.
Another reality of electronic voting machines is that large-scale fraud could be
accomplished more easily, and with significantly less effort in comparison to other
voting methods. Manipulation of electronic data or machinery can potentially be
done remotely and efficiently, and could affect more votes than an attack on physical
ballots or machinery at a polling station. Furthermore, an attack on an electronic
voting machine has a higher chance of going completely undetected, due to the lack
of an auditing mechanism.
Many have suggested equipping the existing electronic voting machines with
printers, to produce a receipt of each ballot. These receipts would be retained by
the polling station. Although this does provide a way to conduct a recount, thereby
creating an auditing mechanism, these paper audit trails “provide, at best, a short
term fix to a fundamentally flawed approach” [91]. Relying on manual recounting
somewhat undermines the advantages of an electronic system.
The real motivation behind the use of paper receipts is that of verifiability:
with physical receipts the tally can be audited, and therefore no trust needs to be
placed in the electronic machines themselves. This quality is of crucial importance
to the integrity of an election. The correctness of a software program, and therefore
the behavior of an electronic machine, is known to not be provable. If an electronic
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voting scheme is designed to eliminate the necessity for trust in the machines, then
it potentially can administer a fully auditable electronic election. We claim that a
scheme introduced in 2002 by David Chaum [19] accomplishes such a feat in a novel,
elegant manner.
With the use of transparency in all stages of Chaum’s Voter-Verifiable election
scheme, it is possible to audit each step, detecting error or fraud with all but negligi-
ble probability (described in Section 1.3). The advantage of having these verification
procedures is that any post-election question about its legitimacy is answered in the
form of proof. If the election is proven to be trustworthy, then there is no possibility
for controversy. There is also no need to perform a recounting of ballots, which is
still integral to our current election practices.
The central goal of the scheme is that of acceptance and trust by all, especially
the voters, thereby restoring confidence in the quality of our elections and the value
of each vote. It provides sufficient transparency to verify the results of an election,
rather than needing to verify the election procedure or equipment. However, by
eliminating the need to trust anything physical, we instead will need to trust cer-
tain properties of mathematics and cryptography, and be satisfied with probabilistic
integrity of the final tally; rather than assuring absolute correctness of the tally, the
scheme can only assure its accuracy with overwhelming probability.
One major advantage of Chaum’s scheme is that it has been made available
for public scrutiny. Experts and all other interested parties are in fact encouraged to
evaluate and criticize the scheme. The intent is to expose any flaws or weaknesses,
and subsequently work towards improving the scheme. This is in contrast with
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the trend of most other poll station electronic voting systems, whose proprietors
have claimed that it is necessary to keep the details secret for purposes of securing
intellectual property. However, the existence of open source systems is exactly what
many experts believe lead us to better solutions in technology. In fact, Chaum’s
work has already inspired many others to conduct related research, some of which
we mention in Section 4.4.
1.2 Definitions
We define an election by its purpose: an election is a process to obtain accurate
data representing a set of participants’ answers to a posed question. A vote is what
physically represents a participant’s answer to a particular question. A vote consists
of a selection, generally from a predetermined set of answers, called candidates.
Sometimes a vote contains a selection which is not an element of the predetermined
list, and is called a write-in vote. One or more votes are combined into a structure
called a ballot. An eligible, authenticated participant in an election is called a voter.
We call each question in an election a race, and therefore each race has a set of
candidates, potentially receiving votes from voters.
A voting scheme is a protocol which has a means of receiving votes as input,
and produces an output which is a tally of the votes cast. Therefore, it is a method
for conducting an election. The tally may result in a decision. The decision can, for
example, be the assignment of an individual to a public office, or the institution of a
referendum. In the event of a referendum vote, the set of candidates would consist
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of “yes” or “no”.
A voting scheme, as defined above, can refer to any method that can suc-
cessfully manage an election. The voting schemes that have been used historically
are called traditional voting schemes. Some examples of these schemes are those
which use ordinary paper ballots, lever systems, or punch-card ballots. In contrast,
an electronic voting scheme, or e-voting scheme is one that makes use of electronic
devices to conduct an election. Votes are recorded electronically and possibly tallied
electronically as well. Electronic voting schemes can be further classified into remote
voting schemes or poll station voting schemes.
The term remote electronic voting refers to the subset of electronic voting
schemes which assume that voters are connected remotely through an electronic
network. All setup, communications, and computations are done electronically,
with computers acting as proxies for all voters and other players in the election.
A further subset of remote e-voting schemes are those that utilize the internet to
conduct an election. These schemes are referred to as internet voting schemes or i-
voting schemes. In contrast to remote voting, poll station electronic voting schemes
require that voters cast their votes from electronic voting machines at physical,
central locations. The machines record the votes electronically. It is also possible
for the machines to count, transmit, or tally the votes electronically as well. The
distinction between remote voting and poll station voting protocols is central to this
paper, and will be further discussed in Chapter 2.
A Direct Recording Electronic machine, or DRE-machine, refers to an elec-
tronic device whose purpose is to record votes. Voters’ selections are recorded di-
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rectly into an electronic machine. The DRE-machine may also be able to tally
the votes. We distinguish a DRE-machine from other electronic machines that
merely tally, such as the devices used to count punch-card ballots. A subset of these
DRE-machines are those which employ touch-screen technology as the interface to
the voter. These touch-screen DRE-machines will be the focus of our discussions
on remote e-voting and therefore will be subsequently referred to simply as DRE-
machines.
Figure 1.1 shows the hierarchy of the voting schemes just discussed.
Voting Scheme Hierarchy
Figure 1.1: The categorization of voting schemes.
Ideally, a voting scheme should create an accurate mapping from voter intent
to tallied vote. The steps in an election between each voter’s decision on the posed
question and the announcement of the tally are called translation steps. The more
complicated the election process, and therefore the more translation steps, the more
places there are for breaches of security. These include malicious fraud or corruption
as well as non-malicious errors. As a result, the more simple and transparent a voting
scheme is, the easier error detection is [96].
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In this paper, we choose to focus on governmental elections which are large-
scale and binding. Certainly, other election types exist and are interesting to study.
Other such types include private shareholder elections and university elections, as
well as polls and surveys. Our focus is a result of the recent controversy in the
United States over the validity of the DRE-based electronic voting systems in the
2000 and 2004 general elections. We choose to follow Chaum’s lead by researching
and analyzing ways to improve such elections.
Voting Styles
In an election, the voting style mandates the number of candidate selections
that constitute a vote. There are numerous different types of voting styles [88]. Here
we will distinguish between those which are applicable to our discussion.
• 1-out-of-2 voting (yes/no voting) - There are only two candidates, typically
yes or no. The vote is v = i, where i ∈ {0, 1}
• 1-out-of-L voting - There are L candidates, and the voter selects exactly one
of them. The vote is v = i, where i ∈ {1, . . . , L}.
• k-out-of-L voting - There are L candidates, and the voter may choose a subset
of size at most k of those L. The vote is v =< v1, v2, . . . , vm >, where m ≤
k ≤ L and for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, i 6= j, vi ∈ {1, . . . , L} and vi 6= vj.
• Preferential voting - There are L candidates, and the candidates are numeri-
cally ranked according to the voter’s preference. Thus, the vote is
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v =< v1, v2, . . . , vL >, where for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ L, i 6= j, vi ∈ {1, . . . , L} and
vi 6= vj. The order of the vi is such that the voter prefers vi to vj for i ≤ j.
• Write-in voting - The voter inputs a vote v /∈ {1, . . . , L}. The vote v is stored
as a string of letters, representing the name of an individual, for example.
For any given race, the first four voting style options are disjoint, yet the last
option, write-in voting, may be integrated into any one of the first four. In an
election, there may be multiple races on the ballot, and voting styles may vary from
race to race.
The most flexible of voting schemes would support any of the above voting
styles. We will see however, that not all proposed schemes can handle write-in
voting, and some can only handle 1-out-of-2 voting. Furthermore, not all schemes are
reasonably efficient at all types. This provides us with a criterion that distinguishes
the effectiveness of voting schemes.
Communication Channels
Every electronic voting scheme relies on some type of communication chan-
nel(s) between the voters and other players in the election. These channels can
either be realized through cryptographic or physical means, depending on the cir-
cumstance. The following definitions of types of communication channels have been
modified from [11] and [88].
• Anonymous channel - a communication channel between two parties where
the sender of a message remains anonymous.
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• Untappable channel - a physically secure one-way communication channel for
which a third party is unable to read or alter a message from the sender.
Furthermore, neither the sender nor receiver is able to prove the content of
the message to a third party.
• Untappable anonymous channel - a channel that both maintains the anonymity
of the sender and renders any interception or alteration of a message impossi-
ble. It is physically secure, and the content of a message cannot be proved to
a third party.
• Voting booth - a two-way untappable, anonymous communication channel. It
is the theoretical equivalent of a physical booth. The communications between
the two parties cannot be read or altered by a third party, and the sender
remains anonymous.
• Public bulletin board - a public web site, or physical equivalent. Every legiti-
mate player has permission to “read” messages from and “append” messages
to the bulletin board. However, no party is able to modify or delete any
information.
1.3 Requirements
Every voting scheme must satisfy certain requirements in order to be trusted
in a real election. Clearly, we will require some notion of security. We can define
security rigorously by describing a set of security properties. Thus, the security of
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a particular scheme is measured by the degree to which it adheres to these defined
requirements. Beyond security, there are a number of other criteria that distinguish
voting schemes from each other.
The two foremost and crucial requirements of the security of modern-day vot-
ing schemes are accuracy and anonymity. The difficulty of the electronic voting
problem, however, is a result of the conflicting nature of these two properties.
Chaum has conjectured that it is impossible to achieve unconditional anonymity
and accuracy simultaneously [19]. Therefore, a relaxation is necessary for at least
one of these.
Experts disagree on the exact prioritized order of the requirements of voting
schemes. There is a set of criteria that is considered absolutely necessary for an
implementable scheme to achieve, while the remaining requirements are viewed as
highly desirable. We, like [13, 17, 61, 68], categorize the requirements into two sets:
basic and extended. The schemes that satisfy the basic requirements will thereby
satisfy our definition of a secure electronic voting scheme. Those requirements
which are deemed highly desirable are met by each scheme with differing degrees.
Thus, we can evaluate and compare schemes based on how well they achieve these
requirements.
Basic Requirements
1. Accuracy or Integrity
In an election, the tally should correctly reflect the total number of
legitimate votes cast for each candidate. Any votes that are falsely created or
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modified should not be counted in the tally.
We note that perfect accuracy is not reasonably possible for an elec-
tion of significant scale [16]. Furthermore, since unconditional accuracy and
anonymity are competing properties, we allow for a probabilistic assurance of
accuracy. We thus define a scheme to be accurate if the probability of unde-
tected integrity fraud for n votes is negligible, that is, it decreases exponentially
in n.
2. Anonymity or Ballot Secrecy
A scheme preserves anonymity if the probability of recreating the map-
ping from any voter to her vote is non-negligibly better than a random guess.
In practice, it is acceptable to reveal partial results of an election, which
compromises the anonymity of sets of voters. For example, it is reasonably
permissible to reveal tallies according to precinct in national elections. It is
also impossible to maintain anonymity in the case that every voter selects the
same candidate.
Beyond providing privacy on behalf of the voter, an anonymous scheme
also prevents against certain fraud. If, after the election, a voter can prove to a
third party that she voted a certain way, her vote would be susceptible to vote-
buying and/or coercion. Benaloh coined the term receipt-freeness to describe
this property [11]. A scheme is receipt-free if it is impossible to reconstruct
a provable receipt of a vote outside the voting booth. It is important to
emphasize that this property does not prevent the creation of a receipt in the
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voting booth, as long as it is not readable outside the booth. Instead, it does
not allow a voter to possess or create proof of her vote after the election.
It is worth noting that it is impossible to recover from a compromise in
anonymity [16]. Since it is a matter of information flow, once a vote’s identity
has been revealed, anonymity cannot be regained. However, since anonymity
can only be compromised after a vote is cast, the tally remains unchanged,
and thus integrity is maintained. Therefore, compromises in anonymity will
not necessarily invalidate a particular election.
3. Universal Verifiability or Auditability
Any interested party should be able to independently verify the integrity
of the election tally. This should include verification along each translation
step of the election. Although it is important for an individual to have the
power to verify the correctness of her vote (known as voter-verifiability), the
verification becomes universal only when each individual has the power to
verify the correctness of every legitimate vote cast in an election.
Extended Requirements
The following desirable qualities focus more on the reliability, practicality and
acceptability of a voting scheme. They are not typically emphasized in the technical
literature, yet play a vital role in the implementation of theoretical schemes. We will
revisit these requirements, as well as the basic requirements, in Section 3.4 when we
analyze Chaum’s scheme in this context.
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1. Robustness
The voting scheme should have the capacity to tolerate partial failure
or fraud at any stage of the translation process. The scheme should be able
to continue the election without termination and produce an accurate tally
regardless of these failures. Furthermore, when error or fraud is detected, the
voting scheme should have a mechanism or procedure in place to contain and,
ideally, correct the error. Note that it may be impossible to isolate the exact
votes which were corrupted without sacrificing anonymity.
From the dependability perspective [16], absolute tolerance of faults is
not feasible. Instead, we can measure the robustness of a scheme based on
how well it handles various failures. Also, timely determination of the tally
is crucial to the confidence placed in a given election. Therefore, it is more
desirable to have a real-time recovery mechanism in place rather than after-
the-fact recovery mechanisms like manual recounts.
2. Efficiency
A voting scheme should produce an accurate tally in a timely fashion
after the close of an election, regardless of any error or fraud.
3. Flexibility
A voting scheme should be able to adapt smoothly to a new election,




A voting scheme must provide a way to be evaluated and tested by
Independent Testing Authorities, or ITAs. A scheme should not be declared
certified before undergoing and passing a strict evaluation of its adherence to
a predetermined set of security requirements. If a proprietor insists on keeping
the details of the scheme closed-source to the public, the minimal requirement
should be that all is revealed to the ITAs.
5. Scalability
The size of an election should not affect the security properties of the
scheme. The most scalable scheme should securely and efficiently handle any
number of votes, where the meaning of efficiently depends on the requirements
of the particular election.
6. Usability
A voting scheme should be easy for people to use. It should be conve-
nient, quick, and simple. It should not require a voter to learn any new skills in
the voting booth, perform complex tasks, nor be involved in too many phases
of the process. The less amount of work required on behalf of the voter, the
better, as long as trust in the accuracy of the tally is maintained.
7. Accessibility
A voting scheme must be made accessible to all eligible voters. This
set includes the elderly, the disabled, the computer illiterate, minorities, those
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from differing socioeconomic backgrounds, as well as non-native English lan-
guage speakers.
1.4 Outline of this Thesis
We provide an overview of various types of electronic voting schemes in Chap-
ter 2. In Chapter 3 we introduce Chaum’s Voter-Verifiable election scheme and
follow an example vote through the election process. We present the scheme in the
context of the formal definitions, and analyze it based on the requirements defined.
Chapter 4 discusses the non-technical obstacles that impede the implementation of
Chaum’s scheme in real elections.
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Chapter 2
Overview of Electronic Voting Schemes
Beginning in the early eighties, a large number of technical papers have ap-
peared in the field of electronic voting. A comprehensive list of proposed theoretical
electronic voting schemes is presented in [4], [47], or [61]. Most of the research in
cryptographic e-voting protocols follow a remote voting model. That is, the research
has focused on schemes that rely entirely on an electronic network to conduct the
election. However, very few of these schemes are known to have been implemented.
Furthermore, it appears that none have been implemented in a real, binding election
of significant scale.
One major concern with remote voting that does not appear to be solvable is
that of vote-buying and voter coercion. Without physical security to assure privacy
of the voter at the time of vote casting, anonymity cannot be guaranteed. You can
imagine a situation where a coercer or vote-buyer is physically present during the
vote casting stage, or even impersonating another voter, thus controlling that vote.
Note that this is a problem with any remote voting protocol, not just an electronic
one; any form of absentee voting, for example, poses this same problem.
There are other limitations of remote electronic voting, including the security
of the network platform. These obstacles are discussed in Section 2.1.6 in the context
of internet voting, yet are applicable to any network. It is for these reasons that
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the cryptographic, remote e-voting schemes found in the literature have not been
successfully implemented in governmental elections. Still, it is of great importance
to study these schemes, as their results have impacted other schemes, including that
of Chaum. In this chapter, we will overview both remote and poll station electronic
voting schemes.
2.1 Remote E-Voting Schemes
Remote electronic voting can be categorized into schemes which are based on
a mix-net, blind signatures, or homomorphic encryption. Each of these general
techniques is the basis for multiple schemes in the literature. There is no one
technique that is universally better than the others; the strength of each depends
on the particular application. Each individual scheme optimizes a different set of
extended requirements. Furthermore, each has its own assumptions, both physical
and cryptographic. Therefore, the appropriateness of any particular scheme will
depend on the assumptions and requirements associated with a particular election.
2.1.1 Schemes based on a Mix-net
The first paper to introduce the idea of a mix-net, as well as an electronic
voting protocol altogether, is that of Chaum in 1981 [22]. The goal of a mix-net is to
accept a set of inputs and anonymize them via a secret shuﬄing process, such that
the outputs cannot be traced back to their corresponding inputs. This creates an
anonymous channel. In an application of a mix-net to electronic voting, the inputs
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are encrypted votes, and the outputs are the corresponding plaintext votes. A series
of (Mix) Servers, or Trustees, lie between the inputs and outputs of the mix-net.
Each Server partially decrypts each vote in the set with its own private key, then
performs a secret shuﬄe to the set of partially decrypted votes. Then the Server
forwards all of the votes to the next Server, who functions in a similar manner,
until the last Server in the mix-net has fully decrypted each vote. The result is an
untraceable path from input to output. In the context of voting, that means that it
is impossible to reconstruct the one-to-one correspondence between voter and vote,
thus preserving anonymity.
In any mix-net scheme, it is imperative to verify the actions of the Servers
in order to ensure integrity of the decrypted votes. To do this, there must be an
auditing process. The Servers must produce proofs of correctness of their compu-
tations. Achieving this, while still maintaining anonymity of the votes, is difficult.
The process is inherently inefficient, and many attempts have been made to produce
methods to increase the efficiency of this step.
Technical papers on the subject can be further categorized into three areas:
improvements on mix-nets themselves [1, 2, 3, 50, 51, 52, 53, 74, 76, 78, 104], elec-
tronic voting schemes based on mix-nets [14, 39, 42, 64, 72, 82, 93], and attacks on
particular mix-nets [68, 69, 84].
There are certainly advantages and disadvantages of schemes based on mix-
nets. Accuracy, anonymity, and universal verifiability can all be achieved through
this methodology, and therefore these schemes can be considered theoretically se-
cure. One main advantage of mix-net based schemes is that they can support write-
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in votes, which enhances their flexibility and distinguishes them from most other
schemes. The major disadvantage of these schemes is their efficiency. The tallying
process is considered to be extremely slow in most mix-net schemes. Otherwise,
the efficiency bottleneck is in the proofs of correctness of the Trustees’ work during
the mixing phase. In either case, e-voting schemes based on mix-nets are relatively
inefficient in computation, as well as communication. Evaluation based on the re-
mainder of the extended requirements can only be done on a case-by-case basis.
This evaluation would need to be conducted in the context of an implementation
model.
2.1.2 Schemes based on Blind Signatures
E-voting schemes based on blind signatures are closely related to those based
on a mix-net. Modeled after Chaum’s paper [23] in 1983, the basic protocol consists
of four main phases [79]: registration/authorization, voting, claiming, and tallying.
During the registration stage, the Administrator issues a blind signature to each
voter if presented with a commitment on a valid vote. For the voting stage, the
voter sends her unblinded vote along with the Administrator’s signature to the
public bulletin board via an anonymous channel. The voter can verify that her
vote appears on the board during the claiming phase and publicly dispute it if not.
Finally, the votes found on the board are verified and tallied in the tallying stage.
The contents of the bulletin board are universally verifiable, therefore so is the tally.
This class of schemes does support write-in votes, as well as all other voting
styles. However, they are considered less practical because it is either the case that
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trust must be in placed in the Administrator, or an anonymous channel is assumed.
These schemes are simple, efficient, and flexible, but cannot provide receipt-freeness;
the voter’s blinding factor can be used to prove how she voted. Thus, verifying the
voters’ blinding factors would compromise the anonymity requirement, resulting in
the impossibility of universal verification.
For publications of such schemes, see [21, 23, 38, 77, 79, 80, 94]. Also, two
implementations of a blind signature based e-voting scheme are discussed in Sec-
tion 2.1.5.
2.1.3 Schemes based on Homomorphic Encryption
There are several schemes that are based on homomorphic encryption. The
foremost disadvantage of these schemes is that they do not support write-in votes.
On the other hand, these schemes perform considerably faster than other types,
mostly due to the speed in the tallying phase. Indeed, these schemes are the best
choice for yes/no elections.
Fundamental to these schemes is the homomorphic property:
E(m1) + E(m2) = E(m1 +m2),
where E represents encryption and m1,m2 are messages [37]. The E(m1) + E(m2)
is a calculation in a group G, whereas E(m1 +m2) is a calculation in a group H.
The ‘+’ is a group operator corresponding to each group, and may be different for
G and H [5].
In words, the property states that the sum of two encrypted messages is equal
20
to the encryption of their sum [75]. In the context of an election, the messages are
the votes, and the encryption scheme is some public key encryption scheme that
possesses the homomorphic property. Some known examples are [81], and [13, 25].
The exploitable advantage of the homomorphic property is that the vote tally
can be computed and verified without knowing the content of the individual votes.
After the election, the encrypted votes are combined into a single, encrypted, quan-
tity. The authorities then decrypt this tally, in the group H. Due to the homomor-
phic property, this quantity should equal the quantity resulting from the decryption
of each of the individual votes in group G. In this way, tallying is done without
learning the individual values of the votes. Thus, anonymity is maintained. Since
the values of the votes are never revealed, it is necessary to validate the correctness
of these votes. For this purpose, non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs are used.
Homomorphic encryption schemes can also be made robust by creating thresh-
old variants, where the decryption is shared between multiple servers. Therefore, if
failure occurs for some minority of the servers, termination of the protocol is not
necessary.
The application of the homomorphic property to electronic voting is first at-
tributed to Benaloh [13]. The property of receipt-freeness was also first introduced
in this paper, but the author’s claim that his scheme is receipt-free was later proven
incorrect by [47] in 2000.
Some examples of schemes based on homomorphic encryption are [6, 11, 12,
13, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 37, 47, 61, 62, 95, 97].
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2.1.4 Hybrid Schemes
Each of the three aforementioned remote e-voting techniques have their advan-
tages, yet they also have their limitations. Mix-nets tend to be extremely inefficient,
homomorphic encryption lacks the flexibility for supporting write-in votes and pref-
erential voting efficiently, and blind signatures make universal verification impossible
without compromising the anonymity requirement [58]. There are a couple of innov-
ative, hybrid-style election schemes that combine techniques from multiple methods.
The resulting schemes satisfy certain requirements better than any one technique
could.
• A hybrid scheme published by Golle et al. [42] combines homomorphic encryp-
tion with a mix-net. The homomorphic property is used to initially produce
an efficient, yet unofficial, tally. Because the accuracy of this initial tally is not
satisfactorily secure, the backup mode is later deployed in order to produce
the official tally. This second, mix-net mode is inefficient, yet extremely accu-
rate. Although universal verifiability is not realized, a modified, yet practical
variant called public verifiability is. This refers to the property that only the
inputs which are well-formed according to the scheme’s requirements can be
verified by a third-party, as opposed to verifiability for all possible inputs.
• A hybrid mix-net technique based on ElGamal encryption was developed in
2002 by Boneh and Golle [14]. The idea of the resulting scheme, like that of
[42], is to be able to announce a quick, unofficial result of an election, then
obtain an official, yet inefficient, tally of the votes later. In order to produce
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the initial quick result, the mixing technique used can only guarantee accuracy
with a high probability, but not with overwhelmingly high probability. As a
tradeoff, the inefficient perfect-correctness proofs are foregone, and replaced
with less stringent, “almost entirely correct” proofs. The official results of the
election can be thoroughly computed later, using proofs for perfect correct-
ness, without having to mix the votes again. The result is that efficiency is
emphasized over perfect accuracy, while still maintaining anonymity.
• Vector ballots [58], combine a mix-net with homomorphic encryption. The
ballot is split into two fields, plus an indicator. The first field is for recording
votes which are strictly from the race’s predetermined set of candidates, while
the second field is for recording write-in votes. The indicator is flagged only
in the case of a write-in vote. Efficient homomorphic encryption is used to
process and tally the set of all non-write-in votes, and produces an unofficial
result. The write-in votes are tallied later, off-line, by a mix-net. This is
acceptable since in almost every case, the write-in ballots do not determine
the winner of the election.
2.1.5 Implemented Schemes
There are a few documented cases where remote cryptographic e-voting schemes
have been implemented, but none in an election of significant size, nor in a govern-
mental election. Two such schemes are SENSUS, by Cranor [29], and E-Vox, by
Herschberg [46]. Both were used in small, university-based elections in the late
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1990’s, the former at Washington University and the latter at MIT. Both are mod-
ified versions of the blind signature scheme by Fujioka et al. [38], and were imple-
mented by students. Neither of these schemes would be suitable for the elections
that this paper focuses on, yet they provide interesting starting points for practi-
cality considerations of the theoretical remote e-voting schemes. For an idea of the
scale of the capacity of these schemes, the original election conducted with E-Vox
could handle approximately 100 students with reasonably fast servers in 1997 [46].
2.1.6 Internet Voting
Over the past decade or so, researchers have given serious consideration to
remote voting over the internet. Utilizing the vast capacity of the internet has
multiple perceived benefits, including increased convenience and flexibility, along
with reduced cost and labor. The hope is that i-voting may also result in increased
voter turnout. Certainly, internet voting is an attractive possibility. However, there
are some serious obstacles that prevent the facilitation of a secure election over the
internet. The foremost obstacle is the same as that of any remote voting system: the
privacy of the voter at the moment of vote casting cannot be guaranteed in a remote
setting. Threats of vote buying or voter coercion are a serious concern and violate
the anonymity requirement. Even with the ingenious solutions that cryptography
provides us, there is no way to ensure that a voter will vote in physical privacy in
an internet based election (or in any other remote voting based election).
A third obstacle stems from the fact that a scheme must deal with the ex-
isting platform of the internet itself. In practice, the internet is simply not secure
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enough to use in an election. The reader may wonder why an election cannot be
conducted satisfactorily since we have an (arguably) successful implementation of
financial transactions over the internet. It turns out that elections differ from finan-
cial transactions in a number of critical ways. First, the receipt-freeness requirement
of elections prevents the creation of take-home receipts (unless they are encrypted),
which are crucial for disputes in financial transactions. Second, because an elec-
tion is conducted during one day only, there are time constraints in real elections
that are not as pertinent in financial transfers. For this reason, denial of service
attacks over the internet are a major threat. During a time-restricted election, the
density of attempted attacks on the election servers would likely be greater than
regular attacker behavior on other sensitive servers. The stakes of an election are
sometimes worth more to certain individuals or groups than a major financial trans-
action. While a denial of service attack is not likely to change the results of an
election, it can certainly cause a significant disruption to the process. For these and
other reasons, voting over the internet is a harder problem than that of conducting
financial transactions.
Even though the physical equivalence of a denial of service attack is present
in current voting practices (for example, a power outage at a polling station), the
effects of such an attack on an internet election web site can be much more wide-
spread. Also, fraud in poll station voting is much more likely to be contained to
a particular precinct or small geographic region, whereas with i-voting, these geo-
graphic boundaries do not exist. Furthermore, the geography of the attacker plays
little or no role in i-voting; the threat of distant or foreign attacks is more real.
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Other possible internet-based attacks include web site spoofing, automated
vote buying, and PC viruses. Each of these is a real and potentially catastrophic
threat. More potential threats include man-in-the-middle attacks, insider attacks,
software bugs, and client-side computer vulnerabilities [54]. For any attack on an
i-voting system, detection is more obscure and even if detected, voter confidence
would be greatly affected.
A fourth obstacle of internet voting is the lack of a Public Key Infrastructure,
or PKI [41]. Authenticating an eligible voter before giving her the appropriate
vote-casting privileges over the internet often requires the use of the voter’s own
public/private key pair. This assumes that each voter has a cryptographic key
and that the entire infrastructure is secure and widespread, which is not the case
today. Distributing keys to all eligible voters is a difficult problem that is possible
to overcome, yet unlikely to be solved in the near future.
Another problem is that the testing and certification of internet voting may be
much more difficult. Not all the equipment, such as operating systems and browsers,
will be controlled by the election board. There is increasing disparity, rather than
standardization, in the use of these products.
Furthermore, it can be argued that some of the perceived advantages of remote
internet voting would not come true. For example, some proponents of an i-voting
system claim that one advantage would be increased voter turnout. They argue
that the convenience of being able to vote from your own home would raise the
percentage of voters voting in a single election. We argue against this; we believe
that while i-voting may encourage an increased turnout for a particular set of voters,
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the overall turnout may not change much. This is due to the notion of the digital
divide. It is probable that those who belong to the portion of the divide with poor
computer accessibility will be further separated and possibly disenfranchised by i-
voting technology. Also, the perceived reduction in cost of implementing an i-voting
system compared to current systems may not be realistic. The cost of buying and
maintaining voting servers, standardized databases and routing systems, along with
other costs, need to be considered [17].
Another deterrent is that the result of a United States Department of Defense
$22 million research effort on remote internet voting was quite pessimistic. Project
SERVE (Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment), was halted in early
2004 after the researchers concluded that the proposed experiment was too insecure
to carry out. The proposal was aimed to facilitate remote PC-based voting for
overseas military and other personnel in the 2004 primary and general elections.
The preliminary research reported that all security vulnerabilities of DRE-based
systems still exist in an i-voting context, with the addition of multiple other serious
security concerns.
For further reading on the prospects of internet voting, see [41, 54, 87, 89, 99].
2.2 Poll Station E-Voting Schemes
Only recently have electronic systems been used in poll station elections. Re-
call that we classify schemes as electronic only if votes are cast onto an electronic
device. Thus far, the schemes of this type have been under intense scrutiny by
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security experts. Only in the past decade or so have researchers focused on rigor-
ously ensuring that the security requirements are properly met. We discuss various
approaches below.
2.2.1 Typical DRE-machines
The current class of DRE-based schemes are causing widespread controversy.
They lack universal verifiability; most do not even have a rigorous auditing mech-
anism. The integrity of the tally is not provable, and real security vulnerabilities
have not been properly considered or handled. The networks that connect multi-
ple DRE-machines together are subject to attacks that could disrupt an election,
and the insider threat is significant. Nevertheless, there has not yet been a proven
case of fraud detected. A handful of elections conducted with DRE-machines have
spawned suspicion of malicious fraud [48], and a few DRE-machines have detected
non-malicious errors [65]. The lack of detection, however, certainly does not prove
the absence of fraud.
The crux of the issue, however, is that most companies refuse to publicize the
source code for their products. They claim that the security of their systems depend
on their secrecy, and also that they want to protect their intellectual property from
competitors. Because of this, voting and security experts are unable to properly
evaluate these schemes. Allowing experts to freely study the code could increase
the chances of both exposing and fixing any vulnerabilities. Alternatively, their
evaluation could lead to a proof or verification of the scheme’s security.
In the United States, several companies are in the DRE-based electronic voting
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business. The following is a non-inclusive list of companies whose DRE-machines
have been used in national elections: Diebold Election Systems, Sequoia Voting Sys-
tems, Election Systems and Software, Avante International Technology, MicroVote
General Corporation, and Hart InterCivic.
Despite Diebold Election Systems’ insistence on keeping their code closed-
source, a collection of code was inadvertently leaked in 2002 that appears to be a
part of the company’s AccuVote-TS voting technology. This sparked a published
analysis in 2003 by a group of computer security experts, led by Rubin [60]. The
report highlighted many vulnerabilities, including unauthorized privilege escalation,
incorrect use of cryptography, vulnerabilities to network threats, and poor software
development processes. The affect of this report has been heightened awareness,
controversy, and even bitter debate over the security of DRE-machines in general.
This was the report that started it all: it fueled intense discussions and debate
over how secure our electronic elections have been since then, and prompted many
to recommend against the use of Diebold’s products [67], as well as other DRE-
machines.
2.2.2 Frog Voting
The concept of frog voting is attributed to Bruck, Jefferson, and Rivest [15].
It consists of a novel modular voting architecture. The main idea is to separate
the voting procedure into two distinct stages: vote-generation and vote-casting.
This modular system would provide better security exactly where security is most
crucial: at the vote-casting stage. The vote-casting module in this framework could
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be designed to be extremely simple and transparent, minimizing the trust placed
in electronic devices. The “frog” is a physical token given to the voter during an
election. The frog is initialized by an election official with pertinent election-specific
information. The frog, most likely a simple memory card with “read” and “write”
capabilities, would then be placed in a vote-generation device by the voter. This
device can be as complex as desired, with the goal of usability in mind. Its only
function is to provide an interface with the voter to make her selections and review
them. The voter then transfers the frog to the vote-casting equipment. This device
is required to be as simple and transparent as possible; its functions are to give the
voter a final chance to review her vote, cryptographically sign the confirmed data
file on the frog, then “freeze” all of the data on the frog. The freezing prevents
any further alterations from being made. The vote is now stored in two places:
the physical frozen frog is dropped into a special receptacle, and an electronic copy
is transmitted via a serial port to one or more vote storage units. The former of
these storage options provides an audit trail for recounts. The latter is capable of
efficiently tallying the votes in a universally verifiable manner.
2.2.3 VoteHere’s VHTi
The company VoteHere has developed technology that complements any ex-
isting e-voting DRE-based scheme [74]. Their product, VHTi, is a voter-verified
auditor. It adds technology that can provably verify the accuracy of the election
tally. The scheme is based on homomorphic encryption in a modified ElGamal cryp-
tosystem. Voters using VHTi are given a physical token, which contains a blank
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ballot. After voting, a set of verification codes (which prove to voter that her vote
was recorded correctly, yet reveal no information about the content of the vote to
others) are printed on a receipt and retained by the voter. The assignment of the
codes corresponds to a random permutation that is specific to each ballot, which
the DRE-machine had committed to before the voting had begun. The voter can
later verify on an election web site that her receipt gets posted correctly. Audits are
performed on the operations of the DRE-machines by checking their commitments
on the random permutations. More information can be found at www.votehere.net.
This technology seems to be quite promising. Like Chaum’s scheme, the VHTi uses
both encrypted receipts and has similar goals.
2.3 Summary
Thus far, there is no practical, provably secure e-voting scheme that can
be trusted in a large-scale, binding, governmental election. The remote e-voting
schemes are of great theoretical importance, but have not yet proven to be practical
in an election of this type. On the other hand, the current poll station e-voting
schemes either seem too vulnerable or are still in the stages of development. Chaum’s
scheme is a poll station e-voting protocol that makes excellent use of cryptography
and other mathematical properties in order to achieve a level of transparency and
verifiability not yet seen by other poll station schemes, while still meeting many
of the practical concerns that most remote e-voting systems lack. We present this
innovative scheme in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
Chaum’s Voter-Verifiable Election Scheme
3.1 Features
Chaum’s Voter-Verifiable election scheme provides a novel, elegant means to
conduct elections. Due to the widespread controversy over the trustworthiness of the
current DRE-based electronic voting schemes, the voting community currently has
focused on creating transparency in elections. Chaum’s scheme does just that: the
final tally can be mathematically proven to be secure through end-to-end auditing
mechanisms. The proofs are conducted publicly, creating total transparency for
every translation step of the election. The scheme holds all parties accountable,
thereby eliminating the need to trust any person or device.
Since all processes in Chaum’s scheme are conducted electronically, election
security can be indisputably verified in real-time. This is a clear advantage over
any scheme that either relies on lengthy manual recounts for election verification,
or one that does not meaningfully verify results at all (like many current DRE-
based schemes). No e-voting scheme before Chaum’s has provided a practical and
transparent universally verifiable scheme.
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3.2 Overview of the Election Procedure
We present an overview of Chaum’s Voter-Verifiable election scheme in this
section.
Chaum’s scheme is designed to run on any existing DRE-machine. Each
machine needs to be equipped with a special purpose printer unit, yet this is the
only hardware modification necessary. Special software would be created in order
to meet the design elements of the scheme. The following steps give an overview of
the election process.
1. At the DRE-machine, an authenticated voter selects her desired candidate and
submits it as her vote.
2. The DRE-machine prints a matrix of pixels onto each of two transparent
sheets of paper, called receipts. When aligned correctly, these receipts re-
veal a plaintext image of the chosen candidate’s name. This image is called
the Ballot image. Each receipt alone looks like pixels of random noise and is
considered an encrypted representation of the vote since it reveals no infor-
mation about the vote. The DRE-machine also prints additional information
onto each receipt that is necessary for decryption.
3. The voter verifies her selection at this time; if the Ballot image shown is
incorrect, the voter may cancel this receipt and start over.
4. The voter randomly selects one receipt to keep as an encrypted receipt and
informs the DRE-machine of her selection of this chosen receipt.
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5. The DRE-machine prints a pair of digital signatures on both receipts. These
signatures are later used to test the authenticity of the chosen receipt.
6. The voter separates the two receipts and keeps the chosen receipt. The other,
unchosen receipt, gets physically destroyed in a shredder to prevent reconstruc-
tion of the Ballot image outside the voting booth. Likewise, the corresponding
electronic copy will be destroyed from the machine’s memory.
7. Outside the polling station, the voter or a third party can verify both the
authenticity of the chosen receipt and the correctness of the decryption infor-
mation printed by the DRE-machine using a small, hand-held scanner device.
8. For each legitimate vote cast, an electronic copy of the chosen receipt is posted
by the DRE-machine to a public web site. Voters can verify that a copy of
their receipt, now called their vote, has been correctly posted to the web site.
The presence of a vote in this initial receipt batch effectively ensures its correct
inclusion in the final tally.
9. A group of election Trustees collectively, yet sequentially, transform a batch of
votes taken from the web site into their corresponding plaintext Ballot image.
Each Trustee partially decrypts each vote and applies a secret permutation to
all votes in the batch before passing control to the next Trustee. By distrib-
uting the work among the Trustees as such, the anonymity of the votes is
maintained. The output of each Trustee’s operations are posted to the web
site for use in the auditing stage.
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10. The fully decrypted votes in this final receipt batch are tallied using dependable
software. This can be done redundantly by competing software packages in
order to ensure accuracy.
11. An audit is performed on the operations of the Trustees. As a result, either
integrity fraud is detected for one or more Trustees, or the election is certified
to be accurate.
3.3 Chaum’s Scheme
We present Chaum’s scheme by following an example vote through the procedure.
This illustration should be sufficient for understanding the security analysis of the
scheme presented in Section 3.4, which is our main focus. Full details of the scheme
can be found either in the original paper by Chaum [19], or in an analysis by Bryans
and Ryan [16]. Other related publications include [24, 90, 91, 102], and [103].
We divide the description of the scheme into four main sections: receipt con-
struction, receipt verifications, decryption, and audits on the decryption.
3.3.1 Receipt Construction
The construction of the receipts is based on visual cryptography [71], which is a
method to encrypt an image by visually obscuring it. The plaintext image is only
revealed when two separate image layers are superimposed. When separated how-
ever, each image layer looks like random noise. One of these layers is considered the
ciphertext and the other the key. Then, decryption of the ciphertext is only possible
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to those who hold the secret decryption key. The role of visual cryptography in
Chaum’s scheme is to provide an encrypted receipt to the voter that proves that
a vote is correctly included in the tally, yet the content of the receipt is unread-
able outside of the voting booth. In this way, the scheme ensures accuracy while
maintaining receipt-freeness.
The building block of Chaum’s adaptation of visual cryptography is called a
pixel symbol. One pixel symbol is a square unit divided into four smaller squares,
two of them colored white and the other two colored black. The two squares of
identical color are always diagonal from each other, creating just two possible pixel
symbols, as shown in Figure 3.1. We assign one of the pixel symbols the binary digit
0 and the other one the binary digit 1.
0 1
Figure 3.1: The two possible pixel symbols for visual cryptography.
Next, Figure 3.2 diagrams all possible results of visually overlaying any pair
of these pixel symbols. We define
⊕
v to be the visual operator [16]. Notice that
the only two images, called stacked symbols, that result from this operation can be
classified as either semi-transparent or opaque. Any two of the same pixel symbol
produce a semi-transparent stacked symbol while different pixel symbols result in
an opaque stacked symbol. We assign the binary digit 0 to either of the semi-













Figure 3.2: The output from the visual operator.
Constructing the Ballot image
We now consider a m × n matrix with mn-many stacked symbols as its en-
tries. In order to represent a particular plaintext English letter in this matrix,
semi-transparent stacked symbols are placed within the matrix in an arrangement
that forms the closest representation of the typewritten image of the letter. The
remaining squares in the background of the matrix are filled with opaque stacked
symbols. Although not a visually perfect representation of the intended plaintext
letter, this allocation of stacked symbols will produce a readable, indisputable ver-
sion of it. We refer to this matrix which contains the plaintext as the Ballot image
matrix. Figure 3.3, replicated from [19], shows how a vote for the letter e would be
represented in an 8× 7 Ballot image matrix of stacked symbols.
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Figure 3.3: The Ballot image matrix for the vote e.
Constructing the Layers
In order to encrypt this vote, the DRE-machine must create two receipt
Layers, top and bottom, such that when overlaid, they reveal the Ballot image.
Figure 3.4 illustrates a possible pair of receipt Layers, denoted tLayer and bLayer,
that visually combine to form the Ballot image for the vote e.
In order to illustrate the procedure for creating tLayer and bLayer, as well
as illustrating the remainder of the voting scheme, we will use a different, simpler
example vote. In this new example, the Ballot image matrix will be of dimension
4× 2. Figure 3.5 displays the Ballot image representing the vote C . Formally, the
goal is to construct tLayer, bLayer such that tLayer ⊕v bLayer = Ballot image.
The DRE-machine will perform a series of steps in order to construct tLayer
and bLayer. The specific construction of these Layers ensures that decryption will
be possible. Recall that inside the voting booth, the voter chooses one receipt
(containing a Layer) to retain and the other, unchosen, receipt (containing the
other Layer) gets destructed. The chosen receipt is posted to the election web
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tLayer bLayer Ballot image
Figure 3.4: The receipt Layers for the vote e (when overlaid, they reveal the
Ballot image).
site and passed to the Trustees. The task of the Trustees, then, is to collectively
reconstruct the Layer from the unchosen receipt, making decryption of the vote
possible.
The example vote C will be used during the remainder of the description of
Chaum’s scheme. We let the number of Trustees be two. The number of Rounds
of encryption and decryption should be double the number of Trustees (for an ex-
planation, see Section 3.3.4), and thus there are four Rounds for our example. The
functions hash and hash′ are public cryptographic hash functions, whose composi-
Figure 3.5: The Ballot image for the vote C.
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= 4. Each ballot has a unique serial
number, q. The DRE-machine has private signature keys ts and bs, corresponding
to the top and bottom, respectively.
Here are the steps that the DRE-machine follows in order to construct tLayer
and bLayer.
• First, the Ballot image, composed of stacked symbols, is converted to its
equivalent binary matrix Ballot (See Figure 3.6). Then this matrix is checker-
boarded into two m× n
2
= 4× 1 matrices, tB and bB. Every alternating matrix
entry, corresponding to every square of one color on a checkerboard, is used to
construct tB and the remaining entries are used to construct bB. The matri-
ces tB and bB are subsequently represented as binary strings (see Figure 3.7).
Formally,
tBi,j := Balloti, 2j−(imod 2)
bBi,j := Balloti, 2j−((i+1)mod 2)
For our example we have:
tB = (0100)
bB = (0010)
• For both the top and bottom, four variables d′l are prepared (one for each
Round of encryption/decryption). The digitally signed serial number q, along











Figure 3.6: The binary matrix Ballot for the vote C.
td′l := hash({q}ts, l)
bd′l := hash({q}bs, l)
• Next, these d′l variables are the input into the second hash function, hash′.
This results in four variables dl for the top layer and four for the bottom. For

























































Figure 3.7: The checkerboarding process of the Ballot.
• Then, for both the top and bottom, the four dl variables are xor’d together





For our example, we have:
tW = (0111)
bW = (0010)
• Next, new binary strings bR and tR are formed according to the relationship
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tR := bW ⊕ tB
bR := tW ⊕ bB
For our example, we have:
bW = (0010) tW = (0111)
⊕ tB = (0100) ⊕ bB = (0010)
tR = (0110) bR = (0101)
• Lastly, (see Figure 3.8)
tLayer is formed by checkerboarding tR and tW
bLayer is formed by checkerboarding bW and bR
Formally,
tLayeri, 2j−((i+1)mod 2) :=
tW i,j
tLayeri, 2j−(imod 2) :=
tRi,j
and
bLayeri, 2j−((i+1)mod 2) :=
bRi,j
bLayeri, 2j−(imod 2) :=
bWi,j
Constructing the Dolls
Since the Layer not chosen by the voter gets destroyed, there must be some
information printed on the chosen Layer that allows the Trustees to reconstruct the
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unchosen Layer, and therefore the vote. The DRE-machine creates objects known
as Dolls that encrypt this information, and prints the Dolls on both receipt Layers.
For both the top and bottom, the Dolls encrypt the d ′ variables that were
formed during the receipt Layer construction. First, d ′1 is encrypted with the public
encryption key e1 corresponding to the Trustee in Round 1. The resulting value,
Doll1, along with d
′
2, is encrypted with e2 (the public encryption key of the Trustee
























































Figure 3.8: The receipt Layers for the vote C.
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Through these layers of encryption, the Dolls hide the d ′ variables, which are
needed to reconstruct the unchosen Layer. Therefore, only through the cooperation
of all Trustees (each applying its corresponding decryption key in the proper Round)
can the Dolls be decrypted, and thus the unchosen Layer recovered.

























The following is a list of all information that is printed onto the receipts.
TOP RECEIPT
• tLayer - top receipt Layer
• q - unique serial number
• tDoll - top Doll
• bDoll - bottom Doll
• {q}ts - the serial number, digitally signed
• {tLayer, q, tDoll, bDoll, {q}ts}to - all receipt information, digitally signed by the
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DRE-machine with its “overall” signing key corresponding to the top
BOTTOM RECEIPT
• bLayer - bottom receipt Layer
• q - unique serial number
• tDoll - top Doll
• bDoll - bottom Doll
• {q}bs - the serial number, digitally signed
• {bLayer, q, tDoll, bDoll, {q}bs}bo - all receipt information, digitally signed by the
DRE-machine with its “overall” signing key corresponding to the bottom
For the remainder of our discussion, we assume the voter had chosen to retain
the top receipt. Therefore, the bottom receipt is the unchosen receipt, and is
destroyed. The following are a series of verifications that can be performed by the
voter.
1. Still inside the voting booth, the voter can verify that the two overlaid receipt
Layers reveal the proper Ballot image (which should be an image of the
name of the candidate she intended to vote for). Formally, she can verify that
tLayer ⊕v bLayer = Ballot image.
2. Once outside the voting booth, the voter can, with the aid of a scanner device,
perform additional verifications on her chosen receipt. Since she had chosen
the top receipt, the scanner device has input
< tLayer, q, tDoll, bDoll, {q}ts, {tLayer, q, tDoll, bDoll, {q}ts}to >.
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Note that the function hash, the DRE-machine’s inverse signature keys
ts−1 and to−1, and the Trustees’ encryption keys el for 1 ≤ l ≤ 4, are all public.
The scanner device:
(a) Computes q˜ = {{q}ts}ts−1 , and checks that q˜ = q
(b) Computes
{t ˜Layer, q˜, tD˜oll, bD˜oll, {q˜}ts} = {tLayer, q, tDoll, bDoll, {q}ts}to}to−1 and checks
that ˜tLayer = tLayer, q˜ = q, tD˜oll = tDoll,
b
D˜oll = bDoll, and {q˜}ts = {q}ts
(c) Computes
• td′l = hash({q}ts, l) for 1 ≤ l ≤ 4
• ̂tDoll = e4(td′4, e3(td′3, e2(td′2, e1(td′1))))
and checks that ̂tDoll = tDoll
The first two checks verify the digital signatures of the DRE-machine. These
checks ensure that the receipt was created by an authentic DRE-machine, and not
forged. The last check verifies that tDoll was formed correctly.
We note that since the value of {q}bs is not known to the scanner device (in
fact it has been destroyed with the bottom receipt), it is impossible to verify the
construction of bDoll. This means that if the DRE-machine had falsified bDoll, it will
go undetected. However, if the voter had instead chosen to retain the bottom re-
ceipt, bDoll would be verified and tDoll would not. A falsified Doll will be decrypted
differently than the correct Doll, and will result in a different Ballot image. There-
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fore, this is one way (but is the only way) that a DRE-machine can alter a vote. If
the DRE-machine falsifies one of the Dolls, then, depending on which receipt the
voter chooses, there is a 50% chance of it being detected.
The following security properties are a result of the aforementioned checks
conducted by the scanner device.
• A forged receipt is always detected by the scanner device since the digital
signatures are verified, and are assumed to be secure.
• For one vote, if one of the Dolls is falsified, the chance of the fraudulent
DRE-machine going undetected is 1
2
.
• For each of n votes, if one of the Dolls is falsified, the chance of the fraud-
ulent DRE-machine going undetected is 1
2n
. Equivalently, a fraudulent DRE-
machine that alters n votes is detected with probability 1− 1
2n
. This probability
is considered overwhelmingly high for even a small value of n. For example, if
n = 8, fraud is detected with approximate probability .996, or approximately
99.6% of the time.
At the close of the election, an electronic copy of every chosen receipt is posted
to the election web site by the DRE-machine. This initial receipt batch becomes the
input into the next phase of the election, the decryption process.
3.3.3 Decryption
A mix-net is used in Chaum’s scheme in order to maintain anonymity of the
votes during decryption. It is possible, instead of using a mix-net, to place all trust
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in one Trustee to solely perform the decryption. But then that one Trustee would
know the correspondence between every voter and her vote. Since that is clearly
undesirable, a mix-net is implemented to distribute the decryption computations
among a series of Trustees.
The input into the mix-net is the initial receipt batch consisting of a set of
encrypted votes read from the election web site. All identifying information, namely
the serial number, is stripped from the votes before entering the mix-net. The batch
of encrypted votes are directed through the series of Trustees, with each Trustee
partially decrypting each vote and performing a secret shuﬄing on each intermediate
batch of votes. The output from the Trustee in the final Round will be the final
receipt batch that consists of the original plaintext Ballot images for these votes.
This final output, along with the output of each Trustee during the intermediate
stages, is posted to the web site for use during the auditing procedure.
Each Trustee possesses a pair of private decryption keys and uses each key
once when performing two Rounds of partial decryption of the votes. The reason
that each Trustee is responsible for two Rounds becomes clear in the explanation of
the auditing procedure in Section 3.3.4.
To continue with our example, recall that the top receipt (which includes
tLayer) was the one chosen by the voter, and therefore is posted to the web site.
It is thus the job of the Trustees to collectively reconstruct bLayer, so that the
Ballot image can be revealed.
Recall that the Ballot image, composed of stacked symbols, has a correspond-
ing binary matrix, Ballot (see Figure 3.6). Also, the Ballot is the checkerboarding
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of the two binary matrices tB and bB. These binary matrices can also be represented
as binary strings (see Figure 3.7). Therefore, the Trustees’ goal of reconstructing
the Ballot image is equivalent to reconstructing the binary strings tB and bB. Due
to how the Dolls were formed, this is actually not possible. Instead of being able to
reconstruct both tB and bB, the Trustees will only be able to reconstruct tB, the bi-
nary string that corresponds to the chosen receipt. Although tB does not reproduce
the original Ballot image altogether, it reproduces a checkerboarded half of it. In
a real implementation of the scheme, the Ballot image matrix is much larger than
4×2. Instead, the size of the matrix would likely be on the order of 100×200 pixels.
Therefore, reconstructing half of the pixels (in a checkerboard design) is enough to
distinguish the names of different candidates from one another. This means that
when the Trustees collectively reconstruct tB, it is sufficient for determining the
vote.
Recall that the following values are associated with the top receipt:
< tLayer, q, tDoll, bDoll, {q}ts, {tLayer, q, tDoll, bDoll, {q}ts}to >
Before passing these values to the last Trustee, the serial number q is stripped
off, along with all other extraneous information. Recall (from Section 3.3.1) that
tLayer was formed by checkerboarding the tR and tW bits. Therefore, the tR bits
can be extracted from the tLayer. The only values required for decryption are
< tR, bDoll >, and these are passed to the last Trustee to begin the decryption
procedure.
Recall that the DRE-machine had constructed tR such that
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tR := bW ⊕ tB.
Since the Trustee knows the value of tR, and wants to reconstruct the value of
tB, it will need to obtain the value of bW (since tB = tR ⊕ bW ). We will show that
indeed bW can be sequentially computed by the Trustees (using bDoll).
Also recall that bR had been constructed according to
bR := tW ⊕ bB.
Notice that the Trustee could also determine the value of tW (from tLayer),
and therefore would simply need to reconstruct bR in order to reveal bB (since bB =
bR ⊕ tW ). However, there is no way for the Trustees (or anyone else) to learn
the value of bR without possessing bLayer, which was discarded with the bottom
receipt. Each Doll contains enough information necessary to reconstruct W from
the corresponding receipt, but nothing about R can be learned from either Doll.
The Trustees’ task has thus been reduced to reconstructing the binary string
bW . Recall that
bW :=
⊕ bdl for 1 ≤ l ≤ 4.
To set aside some notation, since
tB = tR⊕ bW













so that tR0 =
tB.
Now, we illustrate the procedure of one Round of decryption by showing the
operations of the Trustee in the fourth, or last, Round.
Upon input < tR, bDoll >=< tR4,
bDoll4 >, the Trustee performs the following
steps.
(i) For each vote, the Trustee
• Computes {bD4}e−14 =
bd′4, bD3










• Computes hash′(bd′4) = bd4
• Computes tR3 = tR4 ⊕ bd4
(ii) The Trustee performs a secret shuﬄing of all votes in the batch. The shuﬄing
of the votes through the entire mix-net is illustrated in Figure 3.9.
(iii) For each vote, the Trustee passes < tR3,
bDoll3 > to the Trustee in Round 3.
The Trustees in the remaining Rounds subsequently follow the analogous pro-
cedure. For Round l, the Trustee receives the input < tRl,
bDolll > and produces
the output < tRl−1,
bDolll−1 >.
Here are the results of the 4 Rounds of decryption for our example.
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Round 4: Round 3:
tR4 = (0110)
tR3 = (1110)
⊕ bd4 = (1000) ⊕ bd3 = (1110)
tR3 = (1110)
tR2 = (0000)
Round 2: Round 1:
tR2 = (0000)
tR1 = (0110)
⊕ bd2 = (0110) ⊕ bd1 = (0010)
tR1 = (0110)
tR0 = (0100)
Since tR0 = (0100) =
tB, the Trustees have successfully reconstructed tB,
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Figure 3.9: The shuﬄing of votes in a mix-net with 2 Trustees.
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It still appears that we need to trust that the Trustees have performed all com-
putations honestly, without altering the content of any votes and thus jeopardizing
integrity. To eliminate this need to trust them, the scheme implements an auditing
procedure on the operations of the Trustees called randomized partial checking [50].
3.3.4 Audits on the Decryption
The randomized partial checking (RPC) methodology is a way of ensuring integrity
in a mix-net. It is an auditing procedure on the actions of the Trustees that helps
provide universal verification for the votes.
The RPC auditing occurs after the completion of the decryption phase. Each
Trustee is expected to reveal half of the “links” from each of its two secret shuﬄes in
order for an Auditor to verify that its operations were performed correctly. In reality,
the Auditor can be any interested third party and thus the operations of the Trustees
can be verified universally. The links to be revealed are chosen as follows. First, a
random half of the links from the first shuﬄe are chosen by a third party Authority
through a public lottery. It is crucial, however, that the Trustee not know which
“links” are chosen until after its mix-net operations have been completed. Instead,
if the Trustee were aware of which links would be audited, it could cheat undetected
on all votes not selected by the chosen links. After the set of links is chosen from
the first secret shuﬄe, a disjoint set of links is chosen from the second shuﬄe. As
a result, it is impossible to trace the path of any one vote through the operations
of this Trustee. This is necessary for securing anonymity of the votes and is the
reason that each Trustee is involved in two stages of the mix-net. This is illustrated
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in Figure 3.10.
In order to conduct the auditing without compromising anonymity of the votes,
only half of each Trustee’s operations are checked. Because of this, the integrity is
only verified in a probabilistic sense. If a Trustee alters one vote, the auditing proce-
dure will detect fraud with probability 1
2
, since each vote has that same probability
of being chosen for audit. Then if a Trustee alters n votes, fraud is detected with
probability 1 − 1
2n
. The probability of detecting a fraudulent Trustee is thus anal-
ogous to that of detecting a fraudulent DRE-machine, which we determined was
overwhelmingly high, even for a small value of n.
Continuing with our example, we illustrate the auditing process by explaining
the procedure for the Trustee in Round 4.
For each vote audited, the Trustee must publish:









































































Round 4 Round 3︸ ︷︷ ︸
Trustee 2
Figure 3.10: Auditing the mix-net: The set of links revealed in Round 3 are disjoint from
those revealed in Round 4.
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Then the Auditor (for each audited vote):
1. Computes
• ˆbd4 = tR4 ⊕ tR3
(Recall that the Trustee in Round 4 computed tR3 :=
tR4 ⊕ bd4)
• bd4 = hash′(bd′4)
and checks that ˆbd4 =
bd4.
2. Computes
• bD˜oll4 = e4(bd′4, bDoll3)





In the first check, the Auditor verifies that the tR4 value is indeed linked to
the tR3 value that the Trustee passes to the Trustee in Round 3. The second check
verifies that the input bDoll4 is indeed linked to the output
bDoll3.
This Auditing procedure is analogously repeated for each vote selected by the
lottery for audit. This is exactly half of the votes in each Round.
At the end of the auditing phase, there are two possible scenarios. Either
fraud has been detected, or the absence of detected fraud guarantees integrity with
overwhelmingly high probability. If fraud has been detected, it needs to be handled
procedurally according to pre-specified regulations for the particular election. If
no fraud is detected, the election is said to be certified. At this point, the tally
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can be computed from the decrypted votes that were the output of the mix-net
(Section 3.3.3). The tally (computed electronically) can be conducted publicly and
redundantly, ensuring its integrity.
3.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze Chaum’s scheme according to the framework of
requirements outlined in Section 1.3. We describe how the scheme satisfies the
objectives of a secure e-voting system. We follow the aforementioned categorization
into basic and extended requirements.
Basic Requirements
1. Accuracy or Integrity
Accuracy of the election tally is verified through a number of auditing
procedures. Unconditional accuracy is not a property of Chaum’s scheme;
rather, probabilistic accuracy is attained. Any erroneous vote has a proba-
bility of at most 1
2
of going undetected. Although that does not seem to be
satisfactory, the probability of n votes going undetected diminishes in n. More
precisely, n fraudulent votes will go undetected with probability at most 1
2n
.
Practically speaking, this is negligible. For example, rarely do as few as 8
votes change the outcome of a race. If 8 votes are altered, the probability that
no fraud is detected is at most 1
28
≈ 0.004, or a 0.4% chance.
The assurance of accuracy may be reduced if the voters’ choice of receipts
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in the voting booth is biased. When given a choice of top or bottom, the
populace may have a natural bias to choose one of these more often than the
other. This lack of randomness could improve the DRE-machine’s chances of
predicting the unchosen receipt, thus improving its chances of falsifying this
receipt without detection. The solution would be to use a good source of
randomness as a proxy for the voter to make this choice, yet this is admittedly
difficult. Another accuracy concern that is undetectable by the scheme is
ballot-stuffing (false vote creation) by the DRE-machine. This can be detected
procedurally by simply counting the number of votes cast at the polling station
and verifying that this number matches the number of receipts on the election
web site.
One nice property of the scheme is that any legitimate claim that a par-
ticular vote is not included in the final tally can be verifiably confirmed (with
a probabilistic guarantee), yet any false claim can be rightfully dismissed. Any
receipt not generated by an authentic DRE-machine can be indisputably iden-
tified by the scanner device, preventing voters or others from forging receipts.
Also, a voter cannot falsely claim that her receipt was not posted or posted
incorrectly on the web site. Possession of the physical receipt is necessary in
order to place a dispute. Therefore, by simply checking the web site it is trivial
to refute this false claim.
2. Anonymity or Ballot Secrecy
The scheme protects anonymity by encrypting the receipts and dis-
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tributing the decryption to a series of Trustees. Due to the secret shuﬄing
of the votes in a batch, the mapping between input and output for every
Trustee is obscured. A rigorous stochastic analysis of the decryption process
by Gomulkiewicz, Klonowski, and Kutylowski [43] shows that the connection
between the encrypted votes and their plaintexts “remains almost purely ran-
dom”. The scheme is also receipt-free since there is no way to reconstruct
proof of a vote’s content outside of the voting booth.
Anonymity can only be compromised in the following two ways. First,
if any one party possesses all private decryption keys of the Trustees, the
plaintext votes can be recovered and linked to individual voters. That would
require either all Trustees to collude or an adversary to break the encryption
scheme, and neither are assumed to occur. Second, the DRE-machine itself
may secretely opt to not discard its electronic copy of the unchosen receipt.
With the two receipts, it can store the plaintext vote, and use the serial number
to link it to a particular voter. However, current DRE-machines are capable
of an analogous attack on anonymity [103]. There is no way to verify that any
DRE-machine actually discards the information linking voter to vote.
It is important to note that breaches in the anonymity requirement do
not affect the tally. Since the scheme is receipt-free, voters can vote without
pressure from a third party. Their votes should correctly reflect their inten-
tions. Then once a vote is cast, a leak in privacy does not change the content
of the vote. Thus, the tally should correctly reflect voter intent, regardless of
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the breach in anonymity.
3. Universal Verifiability or Auditability
Chaum’s scheme does not quite meet the strict definition of universal
verifiability because it fails to provide end-to-end auditing on every vote. In-
stead, it audits most of the actions on the votes, which we describe below.
This makes the verifiability of the scheme probabilistic, although the chance
that enough votes were altered to change the election outcome is negligible.
Not every voter can be assured that her vote was recorded correctly
by the DRE-machine. In the first place, recall that an attempt by the DRE-
machine to alter one vote will be detected by the scanner device with probabil-
ity 1
2
, yet with probability 1− 1
2n
for n altered votes. Secondly, a vote altered
by a Trustee has the same chances of being detected during the randomized
partial checking: with probability 1
2
, or 1 − 1
2n
for n votes. Despite the fact
that these probabilities are negligible for even a small value of n, any one vote
may be inaccurately included in the final tally with probability 1
2
. Overall, the
integrity of the final tally is overwhelmingly verifiable, yet for any one vote
the accuracy assurance is not very strong.
There are no other ways that cheating can go undetected. There are
multiple checks that indisputably detect fraud or error in all other translation
steps. For instance, anyone with possession of a valid encrypted receipt can
verify that it is correctly included in the initial receipt batch. Otherwise, error
has irrefutably occurred and should be reported. If necessary, an electronic
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copy of the voter’s physical encrypted receipt can be added to the initial receipt
batch manually. Also, votes added or destroyed by the Trustees during the
mixing phase are immediately detectable by simply comparing the number of
inputs to outputs for each Trustee. In addition, any interested third party can
conduct or observe the RPC auditing as well as the ensuing tallying, ensuring
that no cheating occurs during these phases.
Extended Requirements
1. Robustness
As proposed, Chaum’s scheme is not very robust. If one or more of
the Trustees is unavailable, the election is halted. Since only a particular
Trustee knows its private key, decryption cannot resume unless that Trustee
participates properly. However, a key-sharing threshold technique could be
incorporated into the protocol, where participation of any t out of k Trustees,
but no fewer, is necessary for decryption of the votes.
Recall that the auditing of Trustees occurs after the votes are decrypted.
If the tally is deemed inaccurate at this point due to fraudulent or erroneous
Trustees, the mix-net simply needs to restart. Fortunately, a re-vote is unnec-
essary since the input to the mix-net remains the same for another decryption
attempt. For any particular Trustee, if error is detected on only a few votes, it
may be tolerated. If the number of erroneous votes detected could not affect
the outcome of the election, those votes become insignificant.
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Recall that error or fraud by the DRE-machines can be detected dur-
ing the election by a scanner device outside the polling station. If a receipt
generated by an authentic DRE-machine is found to be invalid, the voter may
simply re-vote at that time according to the election policy in place. If enough
invalid receipts are traced to a particular DRE-machine, it should be rendered
unusable, and the election can proceed with the remaining DRE-machines.
If the stored copies of the valid receipts are lost or corrupted by the DRE-
machine, the physical receipts retained by the voters can act as input into the
mix-net process instead.
2. Efficiency
To our knowledge, no time estimates exist for Chaum’s scheme. We
conjecture, based on its comparative (lack of) complexity to other mix-net
schemes, that the work of each Trustee is straightforward and quick. The
audits on the Trustees are done efficiently: only half of the operations are
checked, and each audit consists of strong evidence, rather than a complete
proof, of correctness. The speed of these proofs is significantly better than the
zero-knowledge proofs used by other mix-nets. The work of both the Trustees
and the Auditors does increase with the number of voters, but dividing the
votes into manageably sized batches helps offset any time increase.
3. Flexibility
Chaum’s scheme supports all voting styles listed in Section 1.2, ranking
it among the most flexible of voting schemes. In fact, it is already in a minority
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of e-voting systems for supporting write-in votes, and may be the only poll
station voting scheme that provides universal verification for write-in votes
[103]. The scheme can also easily handle provisional ballots efficiently by
placing them into a separate batch. Since the law relaxes privacy requirements
for provisional ballots, every illegitimate vote in the provisional batch can be
individually removed, and the remainder of votes in the provisional batch
added to the final tally.
4. Certifiability
One elegant property of Chaum’s scheme is that trust in the equipment
or software is not necessary. We can be assured that fraud or error by the
DRE-machine or the Trustees will be detected with overwhelming probabil-
ity. Therefore the security of these components need not rely on pre-election
certification. Instead of having to certify the equipment or software, Chaum’s
scheme certifies the results of an election. The tally is proven correct by the
properties of the universal verification procedures. This idea of proving the
accuracy of a tally is a noteworthy accomplishment of a poll station e-voting
protocol, and is the standout feature of Chaum’s scheme.
5. Scalability
The stochastic analysis of Chaum’s scheme [43] mentioned under the
anonymity requirement resulted in the following corollary: “For achieving [a]
high security level a constant number of stages [Trustees] is enough no matter
how large the population of voters is.” The authors concluded this after com-
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paring the “probability distribution of the permutations linking the encoded
votes with the decoded votes given the information revealed by randomized
partial checking” to the uniform distribution. Therefore, it is unnecessary to
alter the number of Trustees depending on the number of voters. The result is
that the scale of the election should not significantly affect its efficiency. An-
other benefit of keeping the number of Trustees constant is that the Trustee
infrastructure can also remain in tact for all elections. We note here that the
Trustees can be representatives from opposing political parties, for example,
in order to prevent collusion by all of them.
6. Usability
The usability of Chaum’s scheme relies heavily on the user interface
of the corresponding DRE-machine. The more consideration that is given to
usability during the design of the user interface, the more comfortable voters
will be while voting. Once inside the voting booth, the voting process typically
takes two to three minutes using a DRE-machine. With the added tasks of
reviewing, selecting, printing, and destructing receipts, we expect that time
to increase only slightly per voter. The real bottleneck for poll station voting
is the time spent on authenticating voters and not on voting itself.
Voters are expected or encouraged to participate in multiple additional
duties beyond those of traditional voting schemes. From an usability per-
spective, the effectiveness of this depends on the reaction of different voters
and may or may not be advantageous to the scheme. The ideal situation is a
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voting scheme that realizes the concept of “vote-and-go” while simultaneously
ensuring that voters can legitimately and effortlessly trust the integrity of the
tally. Since Chaum’s scheme does not realize “vote-and-go”, we conjecture
that there may be differing reactions: one set of voters will find the additional
duties tedious or even annoying, resulting in a lack of participation. Another
set of voters may be enthused or flattered by the level of involvement they are
given, feeling that their participation in the election is important or dutiful as
a citizen. Additionally, there may be voters, albeit a minority, that fully un-
derstand the intricacies of the scheme and happily participate, knowing exactly
why their efforts are in fact increasing the security of the scheme. There really
is no way to accurately predict the populace’s reaction to usability concerns.
The best measure would be to survey voters after implementation.
7. Accessibility
It is appropriate to evaluate the accessibility of the DRE-machine pro-
viding the user interface for Chaum’s scheme. The best machines of today
provide satisfactory access for the disabled, including the visually impaired





In this chapter, we explore the obstacles which would be necessary to over-
come prior to the implementation of Chaum’s scheme to a real, binding, large-scale
governmental election. The obstacles include various social, legal, and economic
barriers.
4.1 Social Issues
Although the technical aspects of an electronic voting scheme are central to its
worth, a scheme will never be adopted unless it is viewed as trustworthy. Not only
do the election boards and ITAs need to trust it, but, arguably more importantly,
the electorate itself must believe in a scheme’s trustworthiness.
Chaum’s scheme requires trust in the mathematics. Those who are interested
and have the background to understand the mathematical proofs can safely believe
in the scheme’s trustworthiness, but can the general public do that? It is unknown
whether the public would be more willing to trust the word of mathematicians rather
than the current situation: trusting the proprietors of the DRE-machines.
According to [16], it is “not enough for the system to be dependable, it must
also be seen to be dependable. [Chaum’s] scheme is complex and difficult to under-
stand. To what extent could ‘the average voter’ understand the scheme and believe
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the claims? To what extent would assurances of experts suffice? How easy would it
be to undermine public confidence...?” The authors of [16] are planning to conduct a
number of trials that address these sociological questions, which should prove useful
to our evaluation.
There was a field study conducted and published by Bederson and Herrnson
in 2002 [10] that sought to capture the electorate’s reaction to touch-screen style
DRE-machines. The results indicated that the reaction to the Diebold Accu-Vote
TS machines during these trials was that “most of the voters . . . responded favor-
ably to it.” The most relevant question asked in the questionnaire was whether the
voters “trusted that the system recorded the vote they intended to cast.” Of the
responses, 85% reported trust in the system, while 7% reported moderate trust and
the remaining 8% indicated they did not trust or only somewhat trusted the system.
Unfortunately, there have not been any known studies evaluating a prototype
version of Chaum’s scheme. The results of [10] lead us to believe that generally,
voters are open to DRE-machine technology. The authors were reportedly left “op-
timistic, but concerned” regarding electronic voting systems. For Chaum’s scheme,
it is important to consider whether the scheme is too technically complex for voters
to trust it. This seems to be the major obstacle for its public acceptance. Although
all steps are transparent, it requires a sophisticated level of expertise and exposure
to the technical aspects of the voting problem in order for the scheme’s merits to be
fully understood. There have been recent efforts that address this issue by aiming
to produce simplified variants of Chaum’s scheme. There is work being developed
independently by van de Graaf [102], Vora [103], and Bryans and Chaum [24]. These
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schemes seem very promising, and are likely to be viable options in the future. But
even still, gaining widespread acceptance is a problem of education and marketing,
and only a substantial, widespread effort is likely to be effective.
4.2 Legislative Issues
In 2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), an election
reform bill of significant proportions. The bill appropriated three and a half billion
dollars for new voting equipment across the country. The funds are offered to
states that used paper, lever, or punch card systems in 2000 and choose to upgrade
their election technology to DRE-machine or optical scanning systems by 2006.
States that comply with HAVA’s regulations would receive four thousand dollars for
every qualifying precinct in the state [101]. As evidenced by HAVA, DRE-machine
electronic voting has permeated its way into the mainstream, and appears to be
permanent.
The effects of HAVA are both good and bad for Chaum’s Voter-Verifiable
election scheme. On one hand, Congress’ endorsement of DRE-machine technology
helps DRE-based schemes in general earn public acceptance. Also, sales of DRE-
machines have grown as a result of HAVA funds. Having DRE-machines already in
place benefits Chaum’s scheme since it is really an add-on to DRE-based systems.
On the other hand, the compliance deadline for states to be able to receive
HAVA funds is January 1, 2006. Chaum’s scheme has not yet made it to the mar-
ket, and will likely not by the deadline. Therefore, all states that were interested
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in upgrading their voting technologies will have no financial incentive after 2006 to
purchase the necessary components for Chaum’s scheme. Budget constraints have
historically caused states to only comply with the minimal election requirements,
and HAVA does not insist on the level of verification that Chaum’s scheme provides.
Due to this, it is likely that Chaum’s scheme will only be adopted if stricter leg-
islation were passed or other political pressures were to persist that would require
universal verification for DRE-based schemes.
4.3 Economic Issues
The affordability of any scheme is certainly a concern. Luckily, the bulk
of the costs of Chaum’s scheme lie in the DRE-machines themselves. Because of
HAVA, DRE-machines have already become popular, and are likely to become more
widespread by 2006. Therefore in many cases the cost of adopting Chaum’s scheme
would consist of relatively small add-on costs, including special purpose printers,
transparent paper, and shredders for the receipts. There is also the cost of designing,
creating, and maintaining election web sites. There are multiple other recurring costs
that are not seen as additional costs, as they are no different than the costs of other
current election schemes. A few examples of these reoccurring costs include those of




Experts appear to be reacting quite positively to Chaum’s scheme [66]. The
concept of a scheme that provides provable security to an election is indisputably
desirable. It seems that a new era of election technology has begun, with this idea
being fundamental to these developing schemes.
Bryans and Ryans, in their 2003 dependability analysis [16], state that “we
believe that the Chaum voting scheme comes closer than any other scheme we are
currently aware of to meeting all of [our stated] requirements.” Ryan also commented
that the scheme’s “technical (mathematical) core appears robust” [92]. Furthermore,
Gomulkiewicz et al. report that Chaum’s scheme is a “fairly practical scheme de-
signed to meet the demands mentioned” in their paper and that there “is a strong
argument for using such a scenario in practice, provided that all technical problems
(special printers and so) are solved” [43].
4.5 Conclusion
After careful analysis of numerous aspects surrounding the voting problem, we
conclude that it will be difficult for Chaum’s scheme, in its original proposed form,
to be adopted in elections. The social, legislative, and economic factors surrounding
election decisions limit the scheme’s likelihood of implementation. However, the
scheme is innovative and its central ideas are notably promising. It has shifted the
focus of poll station e-voting research towards a new direction: that of provable
security through cryptography. As with the development of any new technology,
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refinement of an original idea is necessary in order to improve upon its weaknesses.
Chaum’s scheme is of great importance, and its simpler variants seem to be headed
toward acceptance for real elections. The scheme already meets a strong definition
of security. Consequently, if a variant is able to sufficiently address the non-technical
concerns, in particular the issue of complexity, it will likely be considered for adop-
tion in a real, binding, large-scale governmental election.
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